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Abstract: With the rapid development of deep learning
techniques, the popularity of voice services implemented
on various Internet of Things (IoT) devices is ever in-
creasing. In this paper, we examine user-level member-
ship inference in the problem space of voice services, by
designing an audio auditor to verify whether a specific
user had unwillingly contributed audio used to train an
automatic speech recognition (ASR) model under strict
black-box access. With user representation of the in-
put audio data and their corresponding translated text,
our trained auditor is effective in user-level audit. We
also observe that the auditor trained on specific data
can be generalized well regardless of the ASR model
architecture. We validate the auditor on ASR models
trained with LSTM, RNNs, and GRU algorithms on
two state-of-the-art pipelines, the hybrid ASR system
and the end-to-end ASR system. Finally, we conduct a
real-world trial of our auditor on iPhone Siri, achiev-
ing an overall accuracy exceeding 80%. We hope the
methodology developed in this paper and findings can
inform privacy advocates to overhaul IoT privacy.
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1 Introduction
Automatic speech recognition (ASR) systems are widely
adopted on Internet of Things (IoT) devices [16, 20]. In
the IoT voice services space, competition in the smart
speaker market is heating up between giants like Ap-
ple, Microsoft, and Amazon [24]. However parallel to
the release of new products, consumers are growing in-
creasingly aware and concerned about their privacy, par-
ticularly about unauthorized access to user’s audio in
these ASR systems. Of late, privacy policies and reg-
ulations, such as the General Data Protection Regula-
tions (GDPR) [7], the Children’s Online Privacy Protec-
tion Act (COPPA) [19], and the California Consumer
Privacy Act (CCPA) [3], have been enforced to reg-
ulate personal data processing. Specifically, the Right
to be Forgotten [48] law allows customers to prevent
third-party voice services from continuously using their
data [2]. However, the murky boundary between privacy
and security can thwart IoT’s trustworthiness [13, 34]
and many IoT devices may attempt to sniff and ana-
lyze the audio captured in real-time without a user’s
consent [33]. Most recently, on WeChat – a hugely pop-
ular messaging platform within China and Worldwide
– a scammer camouflaged their voice to sound like an
acquaintance by spoofing his or her voice [4]. Addition-
ally, in 2019, The Guardian reported a threat regarding
the user recordings leakage via Apple Siri [11]. Auditing
if an ASR service provider adheres to its privacy state-
ment can help users to protect their data privacy. It
motivates us to develop techniques that enable auditing
the use of customers’ audio data in ASR models.
Recently, researchers have shown that record-level
membership inference [10, 32, 39] may expose informa-
tion about the model’s training data even with only
black-box access. To mount membership inference at-
tacks, Shokri et al. [39] integrate a plethora of shadow
models to constitute the attack model to infer mem-
bership, while Salem et al. [32] further relax this pro-
cess and resort to the target model’s confidence scores
alone. However, instead of inferring record-level infor-
mation, we seek to infer user-level information to verify
whether a user has any audios within the training set.
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Therefore, we define user-level membership infer-
ence as: querying with a user’s data, if this user has
any data within target model’s training set, even if the
query data are not members of the training set, this user
is the user-level member of this training set.
Song and Shmatikov [40] discuss the application of
user-level membership inference on text generative mod-
els, exploiting several top ranked outputs of the model.
Considering most ASR systems in the real world do not
provide the confidence score, significantly differing from
text generative models lending confidence scores [40],
this paper targets user-level membership inference on
ASR systems under strict black-box access, which we de-
fine as no knowledge about the model, with only knowl-
edge of the model’s output excluding confidence score
and rank information, i.e., only predicted label is known.
Unfortunately, user-level membership inference on
ASR systems with strict black-box access is challeng-
ing. (i) Lack of information about the target model
is challenging [5]. As strict black-box inference has lit-
tle knowledge about the target model’s performance, it
is hard for shadow models to mimic a target model.
(ii) User-level inference requires a higher level of ro-
bustness than record-level inference. Unlike record-level,
user-level inference needs to consider the speaker’s voice
characteristics. (iii) ASR systems are complicated due
to their learning architectures [5], causing membership
inference with shadow models to be computationally re-
source and time consuming. Finally, time-series audio
data is significantly more complex than textual data,
resulting in varied feature patterns [6, 38].
In this paper, we design and evaluate our audio
auditor to help users determine whether their audio
records have been used to train an ASR model with-
out their consent. We investigate two types of targeted
ASR models: a hybrid ASR system and an end-to-end
ASR system. With an audio signal input, both of the
models transcribe speech into written text. The auditor
audits the target model with an intent via strict black-
box access to infer user-level membership. The auditor
will behave differently depending on whether audio is
transcribed from within its training set or from other
datasets. Thus, one can analyze the transcriptions and
use the outputs to train a binary classifier as the auditor.
As our primary focus is to infer user-level membership,
instead of using the rank lists of several top output re-
sults, we only use one text output, the user’s speed, and
the input audio’s true transcription while analyzing the
transcription outputs (see details in Section 3).
In summary, the main contributions of this paper
are as follows:
1. We propose the use of user-level membership infer-
ence for auditing the ASR model under strict black-
box access. With access to the top predicted label
only, our audio achieves 78.81% accuracy. In com-
parison, the best accuracy for the user-level auditor
in text generative models with one top-ranked out-
put is 72.3% [40].
2. Our auditor is effective in user-level audit. For
the user who has audios within the target model’s
training set, the accuracy of our auditor query-
ing with these recordings can achieve more than
80%. In addition, only nine queries are needed for
each user (regardless of their membership or non-
membership) to verify their presence of recordings
in the ASR model, at an accuracy of 75.38%.
3. Our strict black-box audit methodology is robust
to various architectures and pipelines of the ASR
model. We investigate the auditor by auditing
the ASR model trained with LSTM, RNNs, and
GRU algorithms. In addition, two state-of-the-art
pipelines in building ASR models are implemented
for validation. The overall accuracy of our audi-
tor achieves approximately 70% across various ASR
models on auxiliary and cross-domain datasets.
4. We conduct a proof-of-concept test of our auditor
on iPhone Siri, under the strict black-box access,
achieving an overall accuracy in excess of 80%. This
real-world trial lends evidence to the comprehensive
synthetic audit outcomes observed in this paper.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper
to examine user-level membership inference in the prob-
lem space of voice services. We hope the methodology
developed in this paper and findings can inform privacy
advocates to overhaul IoT privacy.
2 Background
In this section, we overview the automatic speech recog-
nition models and membership inference attacks.
2.1 The Automatic Speech Recognition
Model
There are two state-of-the-art pipelines used to build the
automatic speech recognition (ASR) system, including
the typical hybrid ASR systems and end-to-end ASR
systems [27]. To test the robustness of our auditor,
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(a) A hybrid ASR system. There are three main steps: (i) the prepro-
cessing step extracts features to represent the raw audio data, (ii) the
DNN training step trains the acoustic model and calculates the pseudo-
posteriors, and (iii) the decoding step aims to map the predicted symbol
combinations to texts and output the transcription results with the high-
est score.
(b) An end-to-end system. There are four main components: (i) the en-
coder transforms the input audio into a high-level representation hn, (ii)
the attention mechanism integrates the representation hn with previous
decoder output qn−1 and gain the context output cn, (iii) the decoder
decodes the context output cn with previous ground truth as qn, and (iv)
the Softmax activation like CharDistribution predicts qn auto-regressively
and results in final transcription.
Fig. 1. Two state-of-the-art ASR systems
we implement both open-source hybrid and end-to-end
ASR systems focusing on a speech-to-text task as the
target models.
Hybrid ASR Systems are mainly DNN-HMM-
based acoustic models [46]. As shown in Fig. 1a, typ-
ically, a hybrid ASR system is composed of a prepro-
cessing step, a model training step, and a decoding
step [35]. During the preprocessing step, features are
extracted from the input audio, while the correspond-
ing text is processed as the audio’s label. The model
training step trains a DNN model to create HMM class
posterior probabilities. The decoding step maps these
HMM state probabilities to a text sequence. In this
work, the hybrid ASR system is built using the pytorch-
kaldi speech recognition toolkit [29]. Specifically, fea-
ture extraction transforms the audio frame into the fre-
quency domain, as Mel-Frequency Cepstral Coefficients
(MFCCs) features. For an additional processing step,
feature-space Maximum Likelihood Linear Regression
(fMLLR) is used for speaker adaptation. Three pop-
ular neural network algorithms are used to build the
acoustic model, including Long Short-Term Memory
(LSTM), Gated Recurrent Units (GRU), and Recurrent
Neural Networks (RNNs). The decoder involves a lan-
guage model which provides a language probability to
re-evaluate the acoustic score. The final transcription
output is the sequence of the most suited language with
the highest score.
End-to-End ASR Systems are attention-based
encoder-decoder models [14]. Unlike hybrid ASR sys-
tems, the end-to-end system predicts sub-word se-
quences which are converted directly as word sequences.
As shown in Fig. 1b, the end-to-end system is a uni-
fied neural network modeling framework containing four
components: an encoder, an attention mechanism, a de-
coder, and a Softmax layer. The encoder contains fea-
ture extraction (i.e., VGG extractor) and a few neu-
ral network layers (i.e., BiLSTM layers), which encode
the input audio into high-level representations. The
location-aware attention mechanism integrates the rep-
resentation of this time frame with the previous decoder
outputs. Then the attention mechanism can output the
context vector. The decoder can be a single layer neu-
ral network (i.e., an LSTM layer), decoding the current
context output with the ground truth of last time frame.
Finally, the softmax activation, which can be considered
as “CharDistribution”, predicts several outputs and in-
tegrates them into a single sequence as the final tran-
scription.
2.2 Membership Inference Attack
The membership inference attack is considered as a sig-
nificant privacy threat for machine learning (ML) mod-
els [22]. The attack aims to determine whether a specific
data sample is within the target model’s training set or
not. The attack is driven by the different behaviors of
the target model when making predictions on samples
within or out of its training set.
Various membership inference attack methods have
been recently proposed. Shokri et al. [39] train shadow
models to constitute the attack model against a target
ML model with black-box access. The shadow models
mimic the target model’s prediction behavior. To im-
prove accuracy, Liu et al. [15] and Hayes et al. [10] lever-
age Generative Adversarial Networks (GAN) to gener-
ate shadow models with increasingly similar outputs to
the target model. Salem et al. [32] relax the attack as-
sumptions mentioned in the work [39], demonstrating
that shadow models are not necessary to launch the
membership inference attack. Instead, a threshold of
the predicted confidence score can be defined to sub-
stitute the attack model. Intuitively, a large confidence
score indicates the sample as a member of the train-
ing set [41]. The attacks mentioned in the work above
are all performed on the record level, while Song and
Shmatikov [40] study a user-level membership inference
attack against text generative models. Instead of us-
ing the prediction label along with the confidence score,
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Song and Shmatikov [40] utilize word’s rank list infor-
mation of several top-ranked predictions as key features
to generate the shadow model. Apart from the black-
box access, Farokhi and Kaafar [8] model the record-
level membership inference attack under the white-box
access.
Unlike image recognition systems or text generative
systems, ASR systems present additional challenges [5].
With strict black-box access, attacks using confidence
scores cannot be applied. With limited discriminative
power, features can only be extracted from the predicted
transcription and its input audio to launch membership
inference attacks, i.e., audio auditing in our paper.
3 Auditing the ASR Models
In this section, we first formalize our objective for audit-
ing ASR models. Secondly, we present how a user-level
ASR auditor can be constructed and used to audit the
target ASR. Finally, we show how we implement the
auditor.
3.1 Problem Statement
We define user-level membership inference as querying
a user’s data and trying to determine whether any data
within the target model’s training set belongs to this
user. Even if the queried data is not members of the
training set, but data belonging to this user is members
in the training set, then this user is regarded as the user-
level member of this training set. Let (x, y) ∈ X×Y de-
note an audio sample, where x presents the audio com-
ponent, and y is the actual text of x. Assume an ASR
model is a function F : X → Y. F(x) is the model’s
translated text. The smaller the difference between F(x)
and y, the better the ASR model performs. Let D rep-
resent a distribution of audio samples. Assume an audio
set A is sampled from D of size N (A ∼ DN ). Let U be
the speaker set of A of size M (U ← A). The ASR model
trained with the dataset A is denoted as FA. Let A rep-
resent our auditor, and the user-level auditing process
can be formalized as:
– A speaker u has S =
⋃m
i=1(xi, yi), where u← S.




i, when y′i = FA(xi).
– Let “member” = 0 and “nonmember” = 1.
– Set r = 0 if u ∈ U , or r = 1 if u /∈ U .
– The auditor successes if A(u, S, Y ′) = r; otherwise
it fails.
Our auditor, as an application of user-level mem-
bership inference, checks a speaker’s membership of an
ASR model’s training set. This ASR model is considered
as the target model. To closely mirror the real world, we
query the target model with strict black-box access. The
model only outputs a possible text sequence as its tran-
scription when submitting an audio sample to the tar-
get model. This setting reflects the reality, as the auditor
may not know this transcription’s posterior probabilities
or other possible transcriptions. Additionally, any infor-
mation about the target model is unknown, including
the model’s parameters, algorithms used to build the
model, and the model’s architecture. To evaluate our
auditor, we develop our target ASR model Ftar using
an audio set Atar with two popular pipelines — hybrid
ASR model and end-to-end ASR model — to represent
the ASR model in the real world. As described in Sec-
tion 2, the hybrid ASR model and the end-to-end ASR
model translate the audio in different manners. Under
the strict black-box access, the auditor only knows query
audio records of a particular user u and its correspond-
ing output transcription. The goal of the auditor is to
build a binary classifier Aaudit to discriminate whether
this user is the member of the user set in which their
audio records have been used as target model’s training
data (u ∈ Utar, Utar ← Atar).
3.2 Overview of the Proposed Audio
Auditor
The nature of membership inference [39] is to learn the
difference of a model fed with its actual training sam-
ples and other samples. User-level membership infer-
ence, like its record-level variant, requires higher robust-
ness. Apart from the disparity of the target model’s per-
formance on record-level, our auditor needs to consider
the speaker’s characteristics as well. Since the posterior
probabilities (or confidence scores) are not part of the
outputs, shadow models are necessary to audit the ASR
model.
Fig. 2 depicts a workflow of our audio auditor audit-
ing an ASR model. Generally, there are two processes,
i.e., training and auditing. The former process is to
build a binary classifier as a user-level membership au-
ditor Aaudit using a supervised learning algorithm. The
latter uses this auditor to audit an ASR model Ftar by
querying a few audios spoken by one user u. In Sec-
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Fig. 2. Auditing an ASR model. (i) In the training process, we sample n datasets from the auxiliary reference dataset Dref to build n
(n > 1) shadow models. Each shadow model dataset Ashdi ∼ DNref , i = 1, . . . , n is split to a training set A
train
shdi and a testing set




shdi and label their transcriptions as “member” or “nonmember”. Then an
audit model can be trained with the outputs of shadow models. (ii) In the auditing process, we randomly sample a particular speaker’s
(u’s) audios Au ∼ Dusers to query our target ASR model. Feature vectors from outputs of the target ASR model can be passed to
the audit model to determine whether u ∈ Utar ← Atar holds.
tion 4.4, we show that only a small number of audios
per user can determine whether u ∈ Utar or u /∈ Utar.
Furthermore, a small number of users used to train the
auditor is sufficient to provide a satisfying result.
Training Process. The primary task in the training
process is to build up shadow models of high quality.
Shadow models, mimicking the target model’s behav-
iors, try to infer the targeted ASR model’s decision
boundary. Due to strict black-box access, a good qual-
ity shadow model performs with an approximate test-
ing accuracy as the target model. We randomly sample
n datasets from the auxiliary reference dataset Dref
as Ashd1, . . . , Ashdn to build n shadow models. Each
shadow model’s audio dataset Ashdi, i = 1, . . . , n is split
to a training set Atrainshdi and a testing set Atestshdi. To build
up the ground truth for auditing, we query the shadow
model with Atrainshdi and Atestshdi. Assume a user’s audio
set Au is sampled from users’ audio sets Dusers. Ac-
cording to the user-level membership inference defini-
tion, the outputs from the audio Au ∈ Atestshdi where its
speaker u /∈ U trainshdi are labeled as “nonmember”. Other-
wise, the outputs translated from the audio Au ∈ Atrainshdi
and from the audio Au ∈ Atestshdi where its speaker
u ∈ U trainshdi are all labeled as “member”. Herein, U trainshdi ←
Atrainshdi . To simplify the experiment, for each shadow
model, training samples are disjoint from testing sam-
ples (Atrainshdi ∩Atestshdi = ∅). Their user sets are disjoint as
well (U trainshdi ∩U testshdi = ∅). With some feature extraction
(noted below), those labeled records are gathered as the
auditor model’s training set.
Feature extraction is another essential task in the
training process. Under the strict black-box access, fea-
tures are extracted from the input audio, ground truth
transcription, and the predicted transcription. As a
user-level membership inferrer, our auditor needs to
learn the information about the target model’s perfor-
mance and the speaker’s characteristics. Comparing the
ground truth transcription and the output transcrip-
tion, the similarity score is the first feature to repre-
sent the ASR model’s performance. To compute the two
transcriptions’ similarity score, the GloVe model [26] is
used to learn the vector space representation of these
two transcriptions. Then the cosine similarity distance
is calculated as the two transcriptions’ similarity score.
Additionally, the input audio frame length and the
speaking speed are selected as two features to present
the speaker’s characteristics. Because a user almost al-
ways provides several audios to train the ASR model,
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Table 1. The audit model’s performance when selecting either 3
features, 5 features, or 5 features with MFCCs for each audio’s
query.
F1-score Precision Recall Accuracy
Feature_Set3 63.89% 68.48% 60.84% 61.13%
Feature_Set5 81.66% 81.40% 82.22% 78.81%
Feature_Set5 + MFCCs 81.01% 79.72% 82.52% 77.82%
statistical calculation is applied to the three features
above, including sum, maximum, minimum, average,
median, standard deviation, and variance. After the fea-
ture extraction, all user-level records are gathered with
labels to train an auditor model using a supervised
learning algorithm.
To test the quality of the feature set above, we
trained an auditor with 500 user-level samples using the
Random Forest (RF) algorithm. By randomly selecting
500 samples 100 times, we achieve an average accuracy
result over 60%. Apart from the three aforementioned
features, two additional features are added to capture
more variations in the model’s performance, including
missing characters and extra characters obtained
from the transcriptions. For example, if (truth transcrip-
tion, predicted transcription) = (THAT IS KAFFAR’S
KNIFE, THAT IS CALF OUR’S KNIFE), then (miss-
ing characters, extra characters) = (KFA, CL OU).
Herein, the blank character in the extra characters
means that one word was mistranslated as two words.
With these two extra features, a total of five features are
extracted from record-level samples: similarity score,
missing characters, extra characters, frame length, and
speed. The record-level samples are transformed into
user-level samples using statistical calculation as pre-
viously described. We compare the performance of two
auditors trained with the two feature sets. We also
consider adding 13 Mel-Frequency Cepstral Coefficients
(MFCCs) as the additional audio-specific feature set to
accentuate each user’s records with the average statis-
tics. As seen in Table 1, the statistical feature set with
5-tuple is the best choice with approximately 80% accu-
racy, while the results with additional audio-specific fea-
tures are similar, but trail by one percentage. Thus, we
proceed with five statistical features to represent each
user as the outcome of the feature extraction step.
Auditing Process. After training an auditor model,
we randomly sample a particular speaker’s (u′s) au-
dios Au from Dusers to query our target ASR model.
With the same feature extraction, the outputs can be
passed to the auditor model to determine whether this
speaker u ∈ Utar. We assume that our target model’s
dataset Dtar is disjoint from the auxiliary reference
Table 2. The audit model’s performance trained with different
algorithms.
F1-score Precision Recall Accuracy
DT 68.67% 70.62% 67.29% 64.97%
RF 81.66% 81.40% 82.22% 78.81%
3-NN 58.62% 64.49% 54.69% 56.16%
NB 34.42% 93.55% 21.09% 53.96%
dataset Dref (Dtar ∩Dref = ∅). In addition, Uref and
Utar are also disjoint (Utar∩Uref = ∅). For each user, as
we will show, only a limited number of audios are needed
to query the target model and complete the whole au-
diting phase.
3.3 Implementation
In these experiments, we take audios from Lib-
riSpeech [25], TIMIT [9], and TED-LIUM [30] to build
our target ASR model and the shadow model. Detailed
information about the speech corpora and model archi-
tectures can be found in the Appendix. Since the Lib-
riSpeech corpus has the largest audio sets, we primarily
source records from LibriSpeech to build our shadow
models.
Target Model. Our target model is a speech-to-text
ASR model. The inputs are a set of audio files with
their corresponding transcriptions as labels, while the
outputs are the transcribed sequential texts. To simu-
late most of the current ASR models in the real world,
we created a state-of-the-art hybrid ASR model [35] us-
ing the PyTorch-Kaldi Speech Recognition Toolkit [29]
and an end-to-end ASR model using the Pytorch imple-
mentation [14]. In the preprocessing step, fMLLR fea-
tures were used to train the ASR model with 24 training
epochs. Then, we trained an ASR model using a deep
neural network with four hidden layers and one Softmax
layer. We experimentally tuned the batch size, learning
rate and optimization function to gain a model with
better ASR performance. To mimic the ASR model in
the wild, we tuned the parameters until the training
accuracy exceeded 80%, similar to the results shown
in [14, 27]. Additionally, to better contextualize our au-
dit results, we report the overfitting level of the ASR
models, defined as the difference between the predic-
tions’ Word Error Rate (WER) on the training set and
the testing set (Overfitting = WERtrain −WERtest).
The Audio Auditor: User-Level Membership Inference in Internet of Things Voice Services 215
4 Experimental Evaluation and
Results
The goal of this work is to develop an auditor for users to
inspect whether their audio information is used without
consent by ASR models or not. We mainly focus on the
evaluation of the auditor, especially in terms of its ef-
fectiveness, efficiency, and robustness. As such, we pose
the following research questions.
– The effectiveness of the auditor. We train our au-
ditor using different ML algorithms and select one
with the best performance. How does the auditor
perform with different sizes of training sets? How
does it perform in the real-world scenario, such as
auditing iPhone Siri?
– The efficiency of the auditor. How many pieces of
audios does a user need for querying the ASR model
and the auditor to gain a satisfying result?
– The data transferability of the auditor. If the data
distribution of the target ASR model’s training set
is different from that of the auditor, is there any
effect on the auditor’s performance? If there is a
negative effect on the auditor, is there any approach
to mitigate it?
– The robustness of the auditor. How does the auditor
perform when auditing the ASR model built with
different architectures and pipelines? How does an
an auditor perform when a user queries the auditor
with audios recorded in a noisy environment (i.e.,
noisy queries)?
4.1 Effect of the ML Algorithm Choice for
the Auditor
We evaluate our audio auditor as a user-level member-
ship inference model against the target ASR system.
This inference model is posed as a binary classification
problem, which can be trained with a supervised ML al-
gorithm. We first consider the effect of different training
algorithms on our auditor performance.
To test the effect of different algorithms on our audit
methodology, we need to train one shadow ASR model
for training the auditor and one target ASR model for
the auditor’s auditing phase. We assume the target ASR
model is a hybrid ASR system whose acoustic model
is trained with a four-layer LSTM network. The train-
ing set used for the target ASR model is 100 hours of
clean audio sampled from the LibriSpeech corpus [25].
Additionally, the shadow model is trained using a hy-
brid ASR structure where GRU network is used to build
its acoustic model. According to our audit methodol-
ogy demonstrated in Fig. 2, we observe the various per-
formance of the audio auditor trained with four popu-
lar supervised ML algorithms listing as Decision Tree
(DT), Random Forest (RF), k-Nearest Neighbor where
k = 3 (3-NN), and Naive Bayes (NB). After feature ex-
traction, 500 users’ samples from the shadow model’s
query results are randomly selected as the auditor’s
training set. To avoid potential bias in the auditor, the
number of “member” samples and the number of “non-
member” samples are equal in all training set splits
(#{u ∈ Ushd} = #{u /∈ Ushd}). An additional step
taken to eliminate bias, is that each experimental con-
figuration is repeated 100 times. Their average result is
reported as the respective auditor’s final performance in
Table 2.
As shown in Table 2, our four metrics of accuracy,
precision, recall, and F1-score are used to evaluate the
audio auditor. In general, the RF auditor achieves the
best performance compared to the other algorithms.
Specifically, the accuracy approaches 80%, with the
other three metrics also exceeding 80%. We note that
all auditors’ accuracy results exceed the random guess
(50%). Aside from the RF and DT auditors, the au-
ditor with other ML algorithms behaves significantly
differently in terms of precision and recall, where the
gaps of the two metrics are above 10%. The reason is in
part due to the difficulty in distinguishing the “member”
and “nonmember” as a user’s audios are all transcribed
well at a low speed with short sentences. Tree-based al-
gorithms, with right sequences of conditions, may be
more suitable to discriminate the membership. We re-
gard the RF construction of the auditor as being the
most successful; as such, RF is the chosen audio auditor
algorithm for the remaining experiments.
4.2 Effect of the Number of Users Used in
Training Set of the Auditor
To study the effect of the number of users, we assume
that our target model and shadow model are trained
using the same architecture (hybrid ASR system). How-
ever, due to the strict black-box access to the tar-
get model, the shadow model and acoustic model shall
be trained using different networks. Specifically, LSTM
networks are used to train the acoustic model of the
target ASR system, while a GRU network is used for
the shadow model. As depicted in Fig. 3, each training
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Fig. 3. Auditor model performance with varied training set size.
Fig. 4. Auditor model accuracy on a member user querying with
the target model’s unseen audios (Aoutmem) against the perfor-
mances on the member users only querying with the seen record-
ings (Ainmem).
sample (xi, yi) is formed by calculating shadow model’s
querying results for each user uj ←
⋃m
i=1(xi, yi). Herein,
we train the audio auditor with a varying number of
users (j = 1, ..., M). The amount of users M we consid-
ered in the auditor training set is 10, 30, 50, 80, 100,
200, 500, 1,000, 2,000, 5,000, and 10,000.
On the smaller numbers of users in the auditor’s
training set, from Fig. 3, we observe a rapid increase in
performance with an increasing number of users. Herein,
the average accuracy of the auditor is 66.24% initially,
reaching 78.81% when the training set size is 500 users.
From 500 users, the accuracy decreases then plateaus.
Overall, the accuracy is better than the random guess
baseline of 50% for all algorithms. Aside from accuracy,
the precision increases from 69.99% to 80.40%; the recall
is 73.69% initially and eventually approaches approxi-
mately 90%; and the F1-score is about 80% when the
training set size exceeds 200. In summary, we identify
the auditor’s peak performance when using a relatively
small number of users for training.
Recall the definition of user-level membership in
Section 3.1. We further consider two extreme scenarios
in the auditor’s testing set. One extreme case is that
the auditor’s testing set only contains member users
querying with the unseen audios (excluded from the tar-
get model’s training set), henceforth denoted as Aoutmem.
The other extreme case is an auditor’s testing set that
only contains member users querying with the seen au-
dios (exclusively from the target model’s training set),
herein marked as Ainmem. Fig. 4 reports the accuracy of
our auditor on Ainmem versus Aoutmem. If an ASR model
were to use a user’s recordings as its training samples
(Ainmem), the auditor can determine the user-level mem-
bership with a much higher accuracy, when compared to
user queries on the ASR model with Aoutmem. Specifically,
Ainmem has a peak accuracy of 93.62% when the audi-
tor’s training set size M is 5,000. Considering the peak
performance previously shown in Fig. 3, auditing with
Ainmem still achieves good accuracy (around 85%) de-
spite a relatively small training set size. Comparing the
results shown in Fig. 3 and Fig. 4, we can infer that the
larger the auditor’s training set size is, the more likely
nonmember users are to be misclassified. The auditor’s
overall performance peak when using a small number
of the training set is largely due to the high accuracy
of the shadow model. A large number of training sam-
ples perhaps contain the large proportion of nonmember
users’ records whose translation accuracy is similar to
the member users’.
Overall, it is better for users to choose audios that
have a higher likelihood of being contained within
the ASR model for audit (for example, the audios
once heard by the model).
4.3 Effect of the Target Model Trained
with Different Data Distributions
The previous experiment draws conclusions based on
the assumption that the distributions of training sets for
the shadow model and the target model are the same.
That is, these two sets were sampled from LibriSpeech
corpus DL (Atar ∼ DL , Ashd ∼ DL , Atar ∩Ashd = ∅).
Aside from the effects that a changing number of users
used to train the auditor, we relax this distribution as-
sumption to evaluate the data transferability of the au-
ditor. To this end, we train one auditor using a training
set sampled from LibriSpeech DL (Ashd ∼ DL ). Three
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Fig. 5. The auditor model audits target ASR models trained with training sets of different data distributions. We observe that in re-
gards to accuracy and recall the target model with the same distribution as the auditor performs the best, while the contrary is ob-
served for precision. Nevertheless, the data transferability is well observed with reasonably high metrics for all data distributions.
different target ASRmodels are built using data selected
from LibriSpeech, TIMIT, and TED, respectively.
Fig. 5 plots the auditor’s data transferability on av-
erage accuracy, precision, and recall. Once above a cer-
tain threshold of the training set size (≈ 10), the per-
formance of our auditor significantly improves with an
increasing number of users data selected as its user-level
training samples. Comparing the peak results, the audit
of the target model trained with the same data distri-
bution (LibriSpeech) slightly outperforms the audit of
target models with different distributions (TIMIT and
TED). For instance, the average accuracy of the au-
ditor auditing LibriSpeech data reaches 78.81% when
training set size is 500, while the average audit accuracy
of the TIMIT target model peaks at 72.62% for 2,000
users. Lastly the average audit accuracy of TED target
model reaches its maximum of 66.92% with 500 users.
As shown in Fig. 5, the peaks of precision of the Lib-
riSpeech, TIMIT, and TED target model are 81.40%,
93.54%, and 100%, respectively, opposite of what was
observed with accuracy and recall. The observation of
the TED target model with extremely high precision
and low recall is perhaps due to the dataset’s charac-
teristics, where all of the audio clips of TED are long
speeches recorded in a noisy environment.
In conclusion, our auditor demonstrates satisfying
data transferability in general.
Fig. 6. A comparison of average accuracy for one audio, five au-
dios, and all audios per user when training the auditor model with
a limited number of audios per user gained in the auditing phase.
Fig. 7. A varying number of audios used for each speaker when
querying an auditor model trained with 5 audios per user.
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4.4 Effect of the Number of Audio
Records per User
The fewer audio samples a speaker is required to sub-
mit for their user-level query during the auditing phase,
the more convenient it is for users to use the auditor.
Additionally, if the auditor can be trained with user-
level training samples accumulated from a reduced num-
ber of audios per user, both added convenience and the
efficiency of feature preprocessing during the auditor’s
training can be realized.
A limited number of audio samples per user
versus a large number of audio samples per user.
Assuming that each user audits their target ASR model
by querying with a limited number of audios, we shall
consider whether a small number or a large number of
audio samples per user should be collected to train our
auditor. Herein, varying the number of audios per user
only affects the user-level information learned by the
auditor during the training phase. To evaluate this, we
have sampled one, five, and all audios per user as the
training sets when the querying set uses five audios per
user. Fig. 6 compares the average accuracy of the audi-
tors when their training sets are processed from limits
of one audio, five audios, and finally all audios of each
user. To set up the five audio auditor’s training sets,
we randomly select five audios recorded from each user
uj ←
⋃m=5
i=1 (xi, yi), then translate these audios using
the shadow model to produce five transcriptions. Fol-
lowing the feature preprocessing demonstrated in Sec-
tion 3, user-level information for each user is extracted
from these five output transcriptions with their corre-
sponding input audios. The same process is applied to
construct the auditor in which the training data consists
of one audio per user. To set up the auditor’s training set
with all the users’ samples, we collect all audios spoken
by each user and repeat the process mentioned above
(average m̄ > 62). Moreover, since the two auditors’ set-
tings above rely on randomly selected users, each config-
uration is repeated 100 times, with users sampled anew,
to report the average result free of sampling biases.
Fig. 6 demonstrates that the auditor performs best
when leveraging five audios per user during the feature
preprocessing stage. When a small number of users are
present in the training set, the performance of the two
auditors is fairly similar, except the auditor trained with
one audio per user. For example, when only ten users
are randomly selected to train the auditor, the average
accuracy of these two auditors are 61.21% and 61.11%.
When increasing to 30 users in the training set, the av-
erage accuracy of the 5-sample and all-sample auditors
is 65.65% and 64.56%, respectively. However, with more
than 30 users in the training set, the auditor trained on
five audios per user outperforms that using all audios
per user. Specifically, when using five audios per user,
the auditor’s average accuracy rises to ≈70% with a
larger training set size; compared to the auditor using all
audios per user, with a degraded accuracy of≈55%. This
is in part owing to the difficulty of accurately charac-
terizing users’ audios. In conclusion, despite restrictions
on the number of user audio samples when training the
auditor, the auditor can achieve superior performance.
Consequently, we recommend that the number of au-
dios per user collected for the auditor’s training process
should be the same for the auditor’s querying process.
A limited number of audio samples per user
while querying the auditor. While we have inves-
tigated the effect of using a limited number of audios
per user to build the training set, we now ask how the
auditor performs with a reduced number of audios pro-
vided by the user during the querying stage of the au-
dit process, and how many audios each user needs to
submit to preserve the performance of this auditor. We
assume our auditor has been trained using the training
set computed with five audios per user. Fig. 7 displays
performance trends (accuracy, precision, recall, and F1-
score) when a varying number of query audios per user
is provided to the target model. We randomly select a
user’s audios to query the target model by testing m =
1, 3, 5, 7, 9, or 11 audios per user. As Fig. 6 reveals that
the accuracy results are stable when training set size is
large, we conduct our experiments using 10,000 records
in the auditor training set. Again, each experiment is
repeated 100 times, and the results are all averaged.
Fig. 7 illustrates that the auditor performs well with
results all above 60%. Apart from recall, the other three
performances trend upwards with an increasing number
of audios per user. The scores of the accuracy, precision,
and F1-score are approximately 75%, 81%, and 78%,
respectively, when each user queries the target model
with nine audios, indicating an improvement over the
accuracy (≈72%) we previously observed in Fig. 3. It
appears, for accuracy, when the number of query au-
dios per user grows, the upward trend slows down and
even slightly declines. The recall is maximized (89.78%)
with only one audio queried by each user, decreasing
to 70.97% with eleven audios queried for each user. It
might happen because the increased number of audio
per user does not mean the increased number of users
(i.e., testing samples). Since the auditor was trained
with five audios per user, the auditor may fail to recog-
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Table 3. Information about ASR models trained with different
architectures. (W ERtrain: the prediction’s WER on the training
set; W ERtest: the prediction’s WER on the testing set; t: target
model; s: shadow model.).
ASR Models Model’s Architecture Dataset
Size
W ERtrain W ERtest
LSTM-ASR (s) 4-LSTM layer + Softmax 360 hrs 6.48% 9.17%
RNN-ASR (s) 4-RNN layer + Softmax 360 hrs 9.45% 11.09%
GRU-ASR (s) 5-GRU layer + Softmax 360 hrs 5.99% 8.48%
LSTM-ASR (t) 4-LSTM layer + Softmax 100 hrs 5.06% 9.08%
nize the user’s membership when querying with many
more audios.
Overall, with only a limited number of audios used
for audit, e.g. nine audios per user, our auditor still
effectively discriminates a user’s membership in the
target model’s training set.
4.5 Effect of Training Shadow Models
across Different Architectures
A shadow model trained with different architectures in-
fluences how well it mimics the target model and the
performance of the user-level audio auditor. In this sub-
section, we experiment with different shadow model ar-
chitectures by training the auditor with information
from various network algorithms, like LSTM, RNNs,
GRU. If the choice of a shadow model algorithm has
a substantial impact on the auditor’s performance, we
shall seek a method to lessen such an impact. We also
seek to evaluate the influence of the combining attack
as proposed by Salem et al. [32], by combining the tran-
scription results from a set of ASR shadow models, in-
stead of one, to construct the auditor’s training set. The
feature extraction method is demonstrated in Section 3.
We refer to this combination as user-level combining au-
dit.
To explore the specific impact of architecture, we
assume that the acoustic model of the target ASR sys-
tem is mainly built with the LSTM network (we call
this model the LSTM-ASR Target model). We consider
three popular algorithms, LSTM, RNNs, and GRU net-
works, to be prepared for the shadow model’s acoustic
model. The details of the target and shadow ASR mod-
els above are displayed in Table 3. Each shadow model
is used to translate various audios, with their results
processed into the user-level information to train an au-
ditor. Consider this, the shadow model that mainly uses
the GRU network structure to train its acoustic model is
marked as the GRU-ASR shadow model; its correspond-
ing auditor, named GRU-based auditor, is built using
the training set constructed from GRU-ASR shadow
model’s query results. Our other two auditors have a
similar naming convention, an LSTM-based auditor and
an RNN-based auditor. Moreover, as demonstrated in
Fig. 2, we combine these three shadow models’ results
(n = 3), and construct user-level training samples to
train a new combined auditor. This auditor is denoted
as the Combined Auditor that learns all kinds of popular
ASR models.
Fig. 8 demonstrates the varied auditor performance
(accuracy, precision and recall) when shadow models us-
ing various algorithms are deployed. For accuracy, all
four auditors show an upward trend with a small train-
ing set size. The peak is observed at 500 training samples
then decays to a stable smaller value at huge training
set sizes. The GRU-based auditor surpasses the other
three auditors in terms of accuracy, with the Combined
Auditor performing the second-best when the auditor’s
training set size is smaller than 500. As for precision,
all experiments show relatively high values (all above
60%), particularly the LSTM-based auditor with a pre-
cision exceeding 80%. According to Fig. 8c), the RNN-
based auditor and GRU-based auditor show an upward
trend in recalls. Herein, both of their recalls exceed 80%
when the training set size is larger than 500. The recall
trends for the LSTM-based auditor and the Combined
Auditor follows the opposite trend as that of GRU and
RNN-based auditors. In general, the RNN-based audi-
tor performs well across all three metrics. The LSTM-
based auditor shows an excellent precision, while the
GRU-based auditor obtains the highest accuracy.
The algorithm selected for the shadow model will
influence the auditor’s performance. The Combined
Auditor can achieve accuracy higher than the av-
erage, only if its training set is relatively small.
4.6 Effect of Noisy Queries
An evaluation of the user-level audio auditor’s robust-
ness, when provided with noisy audios, is also con-
ducted. We also consider the effect of the noisy audios
when querying different kinds of auditors trained on dif-
ferent shadow model architectures. We shall describe the
performance of the auditor with two metrics — preci-
sion and recall; these results are illustrated in Fig. 9.
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Fig. 8. Different auditor model performance when trained with different ASR shadow model architectures.
To explore the effect of noisy queries, we assume
that our target model is trained with noisy audios. Un-
der the strict black-box access to this target model, we
shall use different neural network structures to build
the target model(s) and the shadow model(s). That is,
the target model is an LSTM-ASR target model, while
the GRU-ASR shadow model is used to train the GRU-
based auditor. For evaluating the effect of the noisy
queries, two target models are prepared using (i) clean
audios (100 hours) and (ii) noisy audios (500 hours) as
training sets. In addition to the GRU-based auditor,
another two auditors are constructed, an LSTM-based
auditor and an RNN-based auditor. The target mod-
els audited by the latter two auditors are the same as
the GRU-based auditor. Herein, the LSTM-based audi-
tor has an LSTM-ASR shadow model whose acoustic
model shares the same algorithm as its LSTM-ASR tar-
get model.
Fig. 9a and Fig. 9d compare the precision and recall
of the GRU-based auditor on target models trained with
clean and noisy queries, respectively. Overall, the audi-
tor’s performance drops when auditing noisy queries,
but the auditor still outperforms the random guess
(>50%). By varying the size of the auditor’s training
set, we observe the precision of the auditor querying
clean and noisy audios displaying similar trends. When
querying noisy audios, the largest change in precision is
≈11%, where the auditor’s training set size was 500. Its
precision results of querying clean and noisy audios are
around 81% and 70%, respectively. However, the trends
of the two recall results are fairly the opposite, and noisy
queries’ recalls are decreasing remarkably. The lowest
decent rate of the recall is about 42%, where the au-
ditor was trained with ten training samples. Its recall
results of querying two kinds of audios are around 74%
and 32%. In conclusion, we observe the impact of noisy
queries on our auditor is fairly negative.
Fig. 9b and Fig. 9e display the LSTM-based audi-
tor’s precision and recall, respectively, while Fig. 9c and
Fig. 9f illustrate the RNN-based auditor’s performance.
Similar trends are observed from the earlier precision re-
sults in the RNN-based auditor when querying clean and
noisy queries. However, curiously, the RNN-based audi-
tor, when querying noisy audios, slightly outperforms
queries on clean audios. Similar to the noisy queries
effect on GRU-based auditor, the noisy queries’ recall
of the RNN-based auditor decreases significantly versus
the results of querying the clean audios. Though noisy
queries show a negative effect, all recalls performed by
the RNN-based auditor exceed 50%, the random guess.
As for the effect of noisy queries on the LSTM-based
auditor, unlike GRU-based auditor and RNN-based au-
ditor, the LSTM-based auditor demonstrates high ro-
bustness on noisy queries. For the most results of its
precision and recall, the differences between the perfor-
mance on clean and noisy queries are no more than 5%.
In conclusion, noisy queries create a negative effect
on our auditor’s performance. Yet, if the shadow
ASR model and the target ASR model are trained
with the same algorithm, the negative effect can be
largely eliminated.
4.7 Effect of Different ASR Model
Pipelines on Auditor Performance
Aside from the ASR model’s architecture, we examine
the user-level auditor’s robustness on different pipelines
commonly found in ASR systems. In this section, the
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Fig. 9. Different auditor audits noisy queries with different ASR shadow model.
ASR pipeline is not just a machine learning, instead a
complicated system, as shown in Fig. 1. In practice, the
two most popular pipelines adopted in ASR systems are:
a hybrid ASR system, or an end-to-end ASR system. We
build our auditor using the GRU-ASR shadow model
with two target models trained on systems built on the
aforementioned ASR pipelines. Specifically, one target
model utilizes the Pytorch-Kaldi toolkit to construct a
hybrid DNN-HMM ASR system, while the other target
model employs an end-to-end ASR system.
Fig. 10 reports the performance (accuracy, preci-
sion, and recall) of the auditor when auditing the two
different target pipelines. Overall, the auditor behaves
well over all metrics when auditing either target models
(all above 50%). The auditor always demonstrates good
performance when using a small number of training
samples. The auditor targeting hybrid ASR in compar-
ison to the end-to-end ASR target achieves a better re-
sult. A possible reason is that our auditor is constituted
with a shadow model which has a hybrid ASR architec-
ture. When focusing on the accuracy, the highest audit
score of the hybrid ASR target model is 78.8%, while
that of the end-to-end ASR target model is 71.92%. The
difference in the auditor’s precision is not substantially,
with their highest precision scores as 81.4% and 79.1%,
respectively. However, in terms of recall, the auditor’s
ability to determine the user-level membership on the
hybrid ASR target model is much higher than the end-
to-end target model, with maximum recall of 90% and
72%, respectively.
When auditing the hybrid ASR target model we ob-
served the model significantly outperforming other mod-
els. The training and testing data for both state-of-the-
art ASR model architectures (i.e., hybrid and end-to-
end) are the same. Thus, to confidently understand the
impact of different ASR model pipelines on the auditor’s
performance, we shall also investigate the difference be-
tween the overfitting level of the hybrid ASR target
model and that of the end-to-end ASR target model, as
the overfitting of the model increases the success rate of
membership inference attacks [39]. Recall that overfit-
ting was previously defined in Section 3.3. The overfit-
ting value of the hybrid ASR target model is measured
as 0.04, while the overfitting level of the end-to-end ASR
target model is 0.14. Contrary to the conclusions ob-
served by [32], the target model that was more overfit
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Fig. 10. The audit model audits different target ASR models trained with different pipelines.
did not increase the performance of our user-level audio
auditor. One likely reason is that our auditor audits the
target model by considering user-level information un-
der strict black-box access. Compared to conventional
black-box access in [32], our strict black-box access ob-
tains its output from the transcribed text alone; con-
sequently the influence of overfitting on specific words
(WER) would be minimized. Thus, we can observe that
our auditor’s success is not entirely attributed to the
degree of the target ASR model’s overfitting alone.
In conclusion, different ASR pipelines between the
target model and the shadow model negatively im-
pact the performance of the auditor. Neverthe-
less, our auditor still performs well when the tar-
get model is trained following a different pipeline
(i.e., an end-to-end ASR system), significantly out-
performing random guesses (50%).
4.8 Real-World Audit Test
To test the practicality of our model in the real world,
we keep our auditor model locally and conduct a proof-
of-concept trial to audit iPhone Siri’s speech-to-text ser-
vice. We select the auditor trained by the GRU shadow
model with LibriSpeech 360-hour voice data as its train-
ing set. To simplify the experiments, we sample five au-
dios per user for each user’s audit. According to the
results presented in Fig. 6 and Fig. 7, we select the au-
ditor trained with five audios per user, where 1,000 users
were sampled randomly as the auditor’s training set. To
gain the average performance of our auditor in the real
world, we stored 100 auditors under the same settings
with the training set constructed 100 times. The final
performance is the average of these 100 auditors’ results.
Testbed and Data Preprocess. The iPhone Siri pro-
vides strict black-box access to users, and the only dicta-
tion result is its predicted text. All dictation tasks were
completed and all audios were recorded in a quiet sur-
rounding. The clean audios were played via a Bluetooth
speaker to ensure Siri can sense the audios. User-level
features were extracted as per Section 3.2. The Siri is
targeted on iPhone X of iOS 13.4.1.
Ground Truth. We target a particular user û iPhone
Siri’s speech-to-text service. From Apple’s privacy pol-
icy of Siri (see Appendix D), iPhone user’s Siri’s record-
ings can be selected to improve Siri and dictation service
in the long-term (for up to two years). We do note that
this is an opt-in service. Simply put, this user can be
labeled as “member”. As for the “nonmember” user, we
randomly selected 52 speakers from LibriSpeech dataset
which was collected before 2014 [25]. As stated by the
iPhone Siri’s privacy policy, users’ data “may be re-
tained for up to two years”. Thus, audios sampled from
LibriSpeech can be considered out of this Siri’s training
set. We further regard the corresponding speakers of
LibriSpeech as “nonmember” users. To avoid nonmem-
ber audios entering Siri’s training data to retrain its
ASR model during the testing time, each user’s querying
audios were completed on the same day we commenced
tests for that user, with the Improve Siri & Dictation
setting turned off.
As we defined above, a “member” may make the fol-
lowing queries to our auditor: querying the auditor (i)
with audios within the target model’s training set (Dû =⋃
Ainmem); (ii) with audios out of the target model’s
training set (Dû =
⋃
Aoutmem); (iii) with part of his or
her audios within the target model’s training set (Dû =







Aoutmem)). Thus, we generate six “mem-
ber” samples where the audios were all recorded by
















where k = 1, 2, 3 and k+m = 5. In total, we collected 58
user-level samples with 6 “member” and 52 “nonmem-
ber” samples.
Results. We load 100 auditors to test those samples
and the averaged overall accuracy as 89.76%. Specifi-
cally, the average precision of predicting the “member”
samples is 58.45%, while the average precision of pre-
dicting the “nonmember” samples is 92.61%. The av-
erage ROC AUC result is 72.6%, which indicates our
auditor’s separability in this experiment. Except for the
different behaviors of Siri translating the audios from
“member” and “nonmember” users, we suspect that an-
other reason of high precision on “nonmember” is due
to the LibriSpeech audios are out of Siri’s dictation
scope. As for the low precision rate on “member” sam-




ing. Additionally, its average accuracy result can reach
100%; thus, the auditor is much more capable in han-
dling Ainmem than Aoutmem, corroborating our observation
in Section 4.2.
In conclusion, our auditor shows a generally satis-
fying performance for users auditing a real-world
ASR system, Apple’s Siri on iPhone.
5 Threats to Auditors’ Validity
Voiceprints Anonymization. In determining the
user-level membership of audios in the ASR model, our
auditor relies on the target model’s different behaviors
when presented with training and unseen samples. The
auditor’s quality depends on the diverse responses of
the target model when translating audio from differ-
ent users. The feature is named users’ voiceprints. The
voiceprint is measured in [28] based on a speaker recog-
nition system’s accuracy. Our auditor represents the
user’s voiceprint according to two accumulated features,
including missing characters and extra characters. How-
ever, if an ASR system is built using voice anonymiza-
tion, our user-level auditor’s performance would degrade
significantly. The speaker’s voice is disguised in [28] by
using robust voice conversation while ensuring the cor-
rectness of speech content recognition. Herein, the most
popular technique of voice conversation is frequency
warping [43]. In addition, abundant information about
speakers’ identities is removed in [42] by using adversar-
ial training for the audio content feature. Fig. 1 shows
that the average accuracy of the auditor dropped by
approximately 20% without using the two essential fea-
tures. Hence, auditing user-level membership in a speech
recognition model trained with anonymized voiceprints
remains as a future avenue of research.
Differentially Private Recognition Systems. Dif-
ferential privacy (DP) is one of the most popular meth-
ods to prevent ML models from leaking any training
data information. The work [40] protects the text gen-
erative model by applying user-level DP to its language
model. This method contains a language model during
the hybrid ASR system’s training, on which the user-
level DP can be applied to obscure the identity, at the
sacrifice of transcription performance. The speaker and
speech characterization process is protected in [23] by
inserting noise during the learning process. However,
due to strict black-box access and the lack of output
probability information, our auditor’s performance re-
mains unknown on auditing the ASR model with DP.
The investigation of our auditor’s performance to this
user protection mechanism is open for future research.
Workarounds and Countermeasures. Although
Salem et al. [32] has shown neither the shadow model
nor the attack model are required to perform member-
ship inference, due to the constraints of strict black-
box access, the shadow model and auditor model ap-
proach provide a promising means to perform a more
difficult task of user-level membership inference. In-
stead of the output probabilities, we mainly leverage the
ASR model’s translation errors in the character level
to represent the model’s behaviors. Alternative coun-
termeasures against the membership inference, such as
dropout, generally change the target model’s output
probability. However, the changes to probabilities of the
ASR model’s output are not as sensitive as changes to
its translated text [32]. Studying the extent of this sen-
sitivity of ASR models remains as our future work.
Synthetic ASR Models. Another limitation of our
work is that we evaluate our auditor on synthetic ASR
systems trained on real-world datasets, and we have not
applied the auditor to extensive set of real-world models
aside from Siri. However, we believe that our reconstruc-
tion of the ASR models closely mirrors ASR models in
the wild.
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Membership Inference Attacks. The attack distin-
guishes whether a particular data sample is a member
of the target model’s training set or not. Traditional
membership inference attacks against ML models under
black-box access leverage numerous shadow models to
mimic the target model’s behavior [10, 17, 39]. Salem
et al. [32] revealed that membership inference attacks
could be launched by directly utilizing the prediction
probabilities and thresholds of the target model. Both
works [17] and [49] prove that overfitting of a model is
sufficient but not a necessity to the success of a member-
ship inference attack. Yeom et al. [49] as well as Farokhi
and Kaafar [8] formalize the membership inference at-
tack with black-box and white-box access. All previ-
ously mentioned works consider record-level inference;
however, Song and Shmatikov [40] deploy a user-level
membership inference attack in text generative models,
with only the top-n predictions known.
Trustworthiness of ASR Systems. The ASR sys-
tems are often deployed on voice-controlled devices [5],
voice personal assistants [37], and machine translation
services [6]. Tung and Shin [45] propose SafeChat to
utilize a masking sound to distinguish authorized au-
dios from unauthorized recording to protect any infor-
mation leakage. Recent works [18] and [44] propose an
audio cloning attack and audio reply attack against the
speech recognition system to impersonate a legitimate
user or inject unintended voices. Voice masquerading to
impersonate users on the voice personal assistants has
been studied [50]. Whereas Zhang et al. [50] propose
another attack, namely voice squatting, to hijack the
user’s voice command, producing a sentence similar to
the legal command. Du et al. [6] generate the adversarial
audio samples to deceive the end-to-end ASR systems.
Auditing ML Models. Many of the current proposed
auditing services also seek to audit the bias and fairness
of a given model [31]. Works have also been presented
to audit the ML model to learn and check the model’s
prediction reliability [1, 12, 36]. Moreover, the auditor
is utilized to evaluate the ML model’s privacy risk when
protecting an individual’s digital rights [21, 40].
Our Work. Our user-level audio auditor audits the
ASR model under the strict black-box access. As shown
in Section 3, we utilize the ASR model’s translation
errors in the character level to represent the model’s
behavior. Compared to related works under black-box
access, our auditor does not rely on the target model’s
output probability [32, 39]. In addition, we sidestep the
feature pattern of several top-ranked outputs of the tar-
get model adopted by Song and Shmatikov [40], instead
we use one text output, the user’s speed, and the in-
put audio’s true transcription, as we do not have access
to the output probability (usually unattainable in ASR
systems). Hence, our constraints of strict black-box ac-
cess only allow accessing one top-ranked output. In this
case, our user-level auditor (78.81%) outperforms Song’s
and Shmatikov’s user-level auditor (72.3%) in terms of
accuracy. Moreover, Hayes et al. [10] use adversarial
generative networks (GANs) to approximate the target
model’s output probabilities while suffering big perfor-
mance penalties with only 20% accuracy, our auditor’s
accuracy is far higher. Furthermore, our auditor is much
easier to be trained than the solution of finding outlier
records with a unique influence on the target model [17],
because we only need to train one shadow model instead
of many shadow (or reference) models.
7 Conclusion
This work highlights and exposes the potential of car-
rying out user-level membership inference audit in IoT
voice services. The auditor developed in this paper has
demonstrated promising data transferability, while al-
lowing a user to audit his or her membership with a
query of only nine audios. Even with audios are not
within the target model’s training set, the user’s mem-
bership can still be faithfully determined. While our
work has yet to overhaul the audit accuracy on var-
ious IoT applications across multiple learning models
in the wild, we do narrow the gap towards defining
clear membership privacy in the user level, rather than
the record level [39]. However, questions remain about
whether the privacy leakage hails from the data distri-
bution or its intrinsic uniqueness of the record. More
detail about limitations are stated in Appendices. Nev-
ertheless, as we have shown, both a small training set
size and the Combined Auditor, which combines results
from various ASR shadow models to train the auditor,
have a positive effect on the IoT audit model; on the
contrary, audios recorded in a noisy environment and
different ASR pipelines impose a negative effect on the
given auditor; fortunately, the auditor still outperforms
random guesses (50%). Examining other performance
factors on more real-world ASR systems in addition to
our iPhone Siri trial and extending possible countermea-
sures against auditing are all worth further exploration.
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Appendices
A. Datasets
The LibriSpeech speech corpus (LibriSpeech) contains
1,000 hours of speech audios from audiobooks which are
part of the LibriVox project [25]. This corpus is famous
in training and evaluating speech recognition systems.
At least 1,500 speakers have contributed their voices to
this corpus. We use 100 hours of clean speech data with
29,877 recordings to train and test our target model. 360
hours of clean speech data, including 105,293 recordings,
are used for training and testing the shadow models. Ad-
ditionally, there are 500 hours of noisy data used to train
the ASR model and to test our auditor’s performance
in a noisy environment.
The TIMIT speech corpus (TIMIT) is another fa-
mous speech corpus used to build ASR systems. This
corpus recorded audios from 630 speakers across the
United States, totaling 6,300 sentences [9]. In this work,
we use all this data to train and test a target ASR
model, and then audit this model with our auditor.
The TED-LIUM speech corpus (TED) collected
audios based on TED Talks for ASR development [30].
This corpus was built from the TED talks of the IWSLT
2011 Evaluation Campaign. There are 118 hours of
speeches with corresponding transcripts.
B. Evaluation Metrics
The user-level audio auditor is evaluated with four met-
rics calculated from the confusion matrix, which reports
the number of true positives, true negatives, false pos-
itives and false negatives: True Positive (TP), the
number of records we predicted as “member” are cor-
rectly labeled; True Negative (TN), the number of
records we predicted as “nonmember” are correctly la-
beled; False Positive (FP), the number of records
we predicted as “member” are incorrectly labeled; False
Negative (FN), the number of records we predicted
as “nonmember” are incorrectly labeled. Our evaluation
metrics are derived from the above-mentioned numbers.
– Accuracy: the percentage of records correctly clas-
sified by the auditor model.
– Precision: the percentage of records correctly deter-
mined as “member” by the auditor model among all
records determined as “member”.
– Recall: the percentage of all true “member” records
correctly determined as “member”.
– F1-score: the harmonic mean of precision and recall.
C. ASR Models’ Architectures
On the LibriSpeech 360-hour voice dataset, we build one
GRU-ASR model with the Pytorch-Kaldi toolkit. That
is, we train a five-layer GRU network with each hidden
layer of size 550 and one Softmax layer. We use tanh
as the activation function. The optimization function is
Root Mean Square Propagation (RMSProp). We set the
learning rate as 0.0004, the dropout rate for each GRU
layer 0.2, and the number of epochs of training 24.
On the LibriSpeech 360-hour voice dataset, we train
another ASR model using the Pytorch-Kaldi toolkit.
Specifically, it is a four-layer RNN network with each
hidden layer of size 550 using ReLU as the activation
function and a Softmax layer. The optimization func-
tion is RMSProp. We set the learning rate as 0.00032,
the dropout rate for each RNN layer 0.2, and the num-
ber epochs of training 24.
On the LibriSpeech 360-hour voice dataset, we train
one hybrid LSTM-ASR model. The acoustic model is
constructed with a four-layer LSTM and one Softmax
layer. The size of each hidden LSTM layer is 550 along
with 0.2 dropout rate. The activation function is tanh,
while the optimization function is RMSProp. The learn-
ing rate is 0.0014, and the maximum number of training
epochs is 24.
On the LibriSpeecch 100-hour voice dataset, we
train a hybrid ASR model. The acoustic model is con-
structed with a four-layer LSTM and one Softmax layer.
Each hidden LSTM layer has 550 neurons along with 0.2
dropout rate. The activation function is tanh, while the
optimization function is RMSProp. The learning rate is
0.0016, and the maximum number of training epochs is
24.
On the LibriSpeecch 100-hour voice dataset, we
train an end-to-end ASR model. The encoder is con-
structed with a five-layer LSTM with each layer of
size 320 and with 0.1 dropout rate. We use one layer
location-based attention with 300 cells. The decoder is
constructed with a one-layer LSTM with 320 neurons
along with 0.5 dropout rate. The CTC decoding is en-
abled with a weight of 0.5. The optimization function is
Adam. The learning rate is 1.0, and the total number of
training epochs is 24.
On the TEDLium dataset, we train a hybrid ASR
model. The acoustic model is constructed with a four-
layer LSTM and one Softmax layer. Each hidden LSTM
layer has 550 neurons along with 0.2 dropout rate. The
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activation function is tanh, while the optimization func-
tion is RMSProp. The learning rate is 0.0016, and the
number of maximum training epochs is 24.
On the TIMIT dataset, we train a hybrid ASR
model. The acoustic model is constructed with a four-
layer LSTM and one Softmax layer. Each hidden LSTM
layer has 550 neurons along with 0.2 dropout rate. The
activation function is tanh, while the optimization func-
tion is RMSProp. The learning rate is 0.0016, and the
number of maximum training epochs is 24.
D. Real-World Audit Test
Siri is a virtual assistant provided by Apple in their
iOS, iPadOs, and macOS. Siri’s natural language inter-
face is used to answer users’ voice queries and make rec-
ommendations [47]. The privacy policy of Apple’s Siri
is shown in Fig. 11. The user, who is considered as a
member user of Siri’s ASR model in our setting, has
used the targeted iPhone for more than two years, fre-
quently interacting with Siri, often with the Improve Siri
& Dictation service opted in. As for the member user’s
member audio, we carefully chose five phrases that the
user had certainly used when engaging with Siri. Start-
ing with “Hey Siri” and phrases from common interac-
tions including “Hey Siri”, “What’s the weather today”,
“What date is it today”, “Set alarm at 10 o’clock”, and
“Hey Siri, what’s your name”. As for the member user’s
non-member audio, we chose five short phrases in Lib-
riSpeech that the user had never used to interact with
Siri (e.g. “we ate at many men’s tables uninvited”).
These phrases were recorded using the member user’s
voice along with our member user’s non-member audios.
The use of either set of phrases should produce an ability
to audit as recall that our method imitates the user as a
whole when auditing the model, irrespective of whether
a specific audio phrase was used to train/update this
model. Lastly, for the nonmember users’ nonmember
audio, the target Siri’s language is English (Australia).
Since the LibriSpeech dataset was collected before 2014
and as stated by the iPhone Siri’s privacy policy, users’
data “may be retained for up to two years”. We con-
sider these recordings to not be part of the Siri train-
ing dataset, and thus we have nonmember users’ non-
member audio. We further assume that our selected user
phrases about book reading are nonmembers.
Fig. 11. The privacy policy of Apple’s Siri
E. Limitations and Future Work
Further Investigation on Features. From our set of
selected features both audio-specific features and fea-
tures capturing model behaviors performs well, as ob-
served in our results. It remains to be seen if additional
audio-specific features would specifically aid the task of
user-level auditing. As there are many potential feature
candidates, we consider this as part of future work.
Auditing Performance with Varied Numbers of
Queries. In our auditor, we observe that only a lim-
ited number of queries per user is necessary to audit
the target ASR model, especially when the auditor is
trained with a limited audios per user. An interesting
observation was that our user-level auditor’s recall per-
formance on more queries per user declines under the
strict black-box access. We are continuing our investi-
gation into why our auditor’s ability to find unautho-
rized use of user data varies in this manner when being
queried with different numbers of audios.
Member Audio in Siri Auditing. In our setting, we
make our best effort to ensure member audios are used
for training. However, in our real-world evaluation, even
with the “Improve Siri & Dictation” setting turned on,
with an extended period of continual use by our user, we
cannot guarantee that member audios of our member
user where actually used for training although we are
confident they have been included.
